Decommissioning and Disarmament
by Ruan O'Donnell

Introduction

Every stage of the Irish peace process has been dogged by the near
intractable 'decommissioning' debate which, one suspects, was placed on the
agenda in order to frustrate republican engagement with the evolving
political system of the Six Counties. In the light of the extraordinary
events of late October 2001 it remains to be seen whether a new threshold
has been crossed which will ultimately produce the thirty-two county Irish
Republic for which so much has been endured and inflicted. To a remarkable
extent for a step of its magnitude, the short term implications of the IRA
initiative are shrouded in uncertainty. No precise or actionable goals are
discernable and the quality of life has not improved one iota for northern
nationalists. Only those at the heart of affairs are in a position to
properly assess the pros and cons of what has occurred and they have very
little to say at present to their own adherents let alone to the general
public. It seems, however, that the unspecified acts of decommissioning
carried out by the IRA and verified by General John de Chastelain's
International Independent Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) did not fall
within the definition of the term as coined in the context of the Good
Friday Agreement of April 1998. This requires explanation and may offer
indications as to the true nature and political potential of the most
historic republican gesture of recent times.

A consensus emerged in 2000 that 'decommissioning' encompassed both the
abandonment of paramilitary equipment and British military infrastructure.
Ironically, loyalist organizations were effectively exempted on the grounds
that their lack of electoral support was deemed to place them beyond the
sanction of constitutionalist politicians. Providing a voice for the right
wing pro-British counter-gangs whilst simultaneously humiliating the elected
representatives of Irish revolutionaries is surely the crowning achievement
of Kitsonianism. In fairness, by no means all Unionist wrecking tactics have
borne fruit; the IRA were previously instructed by David Trimble to offer up
'product' (i.e. weapons) in return for the closure of British army/ RUC
watchtowers, check points and bases. This veered dangerously close to
unilateral acts of surrender and was calculated to elicit automatic
rejection from Sinn Fein and the party's resultant isolation. Nobody was
fooled by this rhetoric and by August 2001 Dublin, London and pro-GFA
elements in Belfast's Stormont Assembly stressed the formula of 'putting
weapons beyond use' or 'beyond access'. It was understood that this would be
matched by phased British army demilitarization which, while obviously
welcome, can never be considered as equivalent to decommissioning in any
form. An irrevocable and unprecedented gesture by Republicans cannot be
equated with minor modifications to the most militarized zone in the western
world.

Given this difficult evolution, it is evident that the IRA's October 2001
initiative was either coerced by their adversaries or volunteered in the
hope of securing significant political advantage. At a time when clarity and
decisiveness are required as never before it does not auger well for the
republican perspective that both theories hold currency within mainstream
politics and the media of these islands. Pushed by massive international
political pressure and pulled by the inducement of actual and potential
electoral growth, the Provisionals have now moved from a de facto position
of 'not one bullet, not one ounce' to accepting the permanent loss of part
of its weaponry. While this has a negligible effect on the IRA's offensive
capacity, the most startling sea change in a generation of conflict has far
reaching symbolic and political ramifications. For the first time in over
200 years of intermittent armed struggle, a republican organization has
willingly divested itself of weapons in order to signal an end to their
future employment. That this has occurred so far short of acknowledged and
stated final victory conditions does not convey a sense of the IRA acting
from a position of strength. The appearance of weakness, real or imagined,
is undeniable. This perception has given rise to a range of canards and
half-truths which will please anti-republicans. The oft-stated theory that
the hand of the Provisionals was forced by events in Columbia and New York
is demonstrably false. Changes in the international political environment
may well have played a part in the overall strategy over a period of years
but the timing of the announcement strongly suggests that it was intended to
save the fragile institutions of the GFA.

Assessing the strategic merit of decommissioning requires acknowledgement
that the IRA's May/ June 2000 dealings with the IICD failed to preserve GFA
institutions from suspension, as did the fleeting re-engagement with De
Chastelain in March 2001. The subsequent announcement that modalities of
arms destruction had been agreed in August 2001 were also rejected by
Trimble. More alarming is that the October 2001 'commencement' failed in and
of itself to shore up the Belfast Executive. The powerlessness of
pro-Agreement republicans has been repeatedly exposed by Unionists who claim
to be open to the prospect of 'Fenians about the place'. For obvious reasons
the task of concentrating minds on the real prize was not delegated, as
before, to the IRA, although the constitutional solution was scarcely less
damaging to political stability in the North. The bizarre re-designation of
MLAs within the Alliance Party and Women's Coalition in order to save
Trimble's leadership confirmed that crucial GFA regulations are open to
direct revision by London. So much for the democratic will of the people
expressed North and South. Whatever its potential to effect progressive
change in Ireland, the GFA can never again be regarded an international
treaty between interested governments, let alone the midwife of a devolved
free-standing and power-sharing Executive. Its ultimate form is yet to be
determined.

Given this discouraging precedent of tampering with the hitherto sacrosanct
GFA, one wonders whether the desired expansion of the modest remit of
cross-border bodies and the predicted maturation of a 51% reunification vote
in a Six County plebiscite on partition can withstand inevitable Unionist
and British manipulation. Dr. John Reid's timely intervention on party
designations demonstrated that London remains the sole arbiter of Irish
self-determination. The silver lining for Sinn Fein may be that the latest
example of Unionist vetoism seems to be taxing the patience of Tony Blair's
administration, although this will count for nothing unless London openly
encourages and actively facilitates Irish national interests for the first
time in modern history. Lesser policy shifts were only extorted by violence
and the threat of violence; tactics now disavowed by the Provisional
Republican Movement. If a Labour government commanding Blair's majority will
not act as a persuader nobody can expect a Tory administration to be so
disposed. The manner in which Washington has presented its campaign in
Afghanistan as a 'war on terror' ensures that the Americans can no longer
afford to take risks with an Irish side-show replete with embarrassing Cuban
and Columbian dimensions. The Dublin establishment, by the same token, would
prefer Sinn Fein within the fold of 'respectable' politics but will not
countenance the party's growth beyond Fianna Fail's marginal seats unless it
becomes unreservedly committed to constitutional forms. To occupy and retain
the urban electorates held by the Labour Party, Sinn Fein will have to
pursue its program of deradicalization which has already seen Irish
reunification kicked to touch along with the socialism which sustained the
party through its most difficult times.

The notably non-belligerent IRA statement of October 2001 implied that a
dump or dumps previously inspected by de Chastelain's team had been treated
in accordance with an agreed methodology. Assent for the secret 'modalities'
was seemingly obtained by August and, therefore, unaffected by subsequent
incidents in the Americas which displeased the White House and Sinn Fein
fundraisers in Washington. It has since been alleged that at least one dump
in Cavan was concreted although not 'capped'. The key question revolves
around whether further acts of constructive sabotage have been timetabled or
agreed. The likely attitude of grass roots republicans towards such
accommodations, with or without an assenting IRA Convention, will determine
whether or not the current leadership of mainstream physical force
republicanism can deliver its base.

There has been much talk of a commencement to IRA disarmament yet the
dismissal of de Chastelain's high profile South African and Finnish
assistants implied a finite and non-incremental action. It remains to be
seen whether tokenistic sacrifices will satisfy British power brokers to the
point that they will persevere with demilitarization or coerce their
Unionist allies to 'work' the GFA. In this honeymoon period the signs are
comparatively positive, although this could rapidly change should the Real
IRA and Continuity IRA regroup. Trimble's threat to seek the extension of de
Chastelain's remit past February 2002 irritated Taoiseach Bertie Ahern,
although the Fianna Fail leader went further than the then First Minister
elect by calling for the dismantling of IRA 'structures' before accepting
Sinn Fein into government in Dublin. Sinn Fein's tortuous road to Leinster
House since 1986 has evidently not been greatly shortened by the IRA's
momentous decision, although Ahern's comments may simply reflect concern for
the vulnerable seats that sustain his working majority. The absolutist
sentiments expressed by the Taoiseach, nonetheless, invite a future backlash
in that they substitute another bitter pill proscribed by the Establishment
for one not yet digested. As Mitchel McLaughlin recently saw fit to raise
the hitherto unthinkable prospect of power sharing between Sinn Fein MLAs in
Belfast and British NIO administrators, it is clear that the arms issue has
inspired new thinking within republicanism. While Sinn Fein are renowned for
pushing open doors, this new level of ideological flexibility has the
potential to seed widespread dissent.

In the fullness of time it may well appear that the IRA's pragmatism on the
dispossession of arms which were once ruthlessly defended was fully
justified in view of the political advances made in consequence but there
are grounds for voicing caution. It is inconceivable that an undefeated
force with substantial community support would ever endorse full disarmament
or dissolution of its cadres. Neither scenario is in the public interest
given the likely response of IRA Volunteers to the profound relaxation of
command control, purpose and authority this represents. As there will be no
British military withdrawal for many years, is it reasonable to assume that
the IRA will be tacitly permitted to retain certain quantities and
categories of firearms. Nobody should expect a return to the state of
unpreparedness witnessed in 1968-9 and the harsh reality of life in north
Belfast and south County Derry demands vigilance. The menace of loyalist
opportunism and disaffection, moreover, is very likely to increase given
that the repercussions for Sinn Fein would be exceptionally severe should
their armed associates be required to again breach the ceasefire in response
to a sustained challenge. Decommissioning, of course, does not represent an
insurmountable impediment to IRA re-engagement if circumstances demanded. It
is, however, a delicate hostage to fortune in an unpredictable arena
brimming with antagonists. At best, it will deflect unwanted attention
incurred by a bizarre combination of recent events. These include queries as
to the mission and fate of the Columbian Three, the electoral prospects of
Sinn Fein in the Twenty-Six Counties and the climate of reaction fostered by
the September attacks in North America.

The republican dilemma is that a secondary gesture on arms would suggest
that the IRA is being not only stood down but disbanded, notwithstanding the
absence of a British withdrawal date and Unionist commitment to maintain
cross-border bodies. Armed Provisionals will either have to develop
post-ceasefire contingencies with the myriad political risks that entails
for the exposed Sinn Fein leadership or cede their status as the primary
republican organization to whoever is willing to accept the mantle. While
the apparent disarray within the RIRA and ingrained negative perceptions of
the CIRA may inhibit the mass defection of IRA activists to their ranks, it
is recognized that Sinn Fein's negotiating stock at Stormont was
immeasurably increased by events in Manchester and the City of London. Those
with faith in the militarist alternative will undoubtedly carve their own
paths regardless of prevailing political conditions and the time may not be
far off when Sinn Fein can gain more by formally jettisoning its residual
IRA connection than from presenting their analysis of armed struggle. The
most likely short term decommissioning dividend, one-off or otherwise, is
the scope it provides to Sinn Fein for plausible distancing from the IRA.
This will prove valuable given that the retirement and prolonged ceasefire
observance of the mainforce will enable others to adopt the title and the
tradition of armed resistance. It must be assumed that even if a major IRA
split is out of the question there will be leakage to new or existing
organizations which believe in the utility of military actions. Politically
minded IRA members may be subsumed by Sinn Fein which will gain the
credibility to denounce former associates from the vantages of Stormont and
the Dail, if not also Westminster. Condemnation of dissidents has already
been heard and frequently articulated hostility towards the physical force
element will surely be the minimum price of accession to coalition
government in the Twenty-Six Counties.

The ability of militarists to pose a formidable threat to the status quo in
the Six Counties will be determined in part by official attitudes towards
the IRA. Demands for the disbandment of the organization are as short
sighted as they are utopian given that it is very much in the interest of
those who support the GFA to permit the IRA to function at a certain level.
The discipline and internal security of the IRA has not been exemplary at
all times but was sufficient to sustain it through a generation of conflict
with one of the most sophisticated and professional armed forces in the
world. The very fact that the IRA possesses substantial arms dumps to
bargain with is proof enough of their competency. The only virtually certain
consequence of forcibly retiring its membership is comprehensive
splintering. While this might well degrade the emergent ad hoc groups to the
status of minor players their raison d'etre would be to make it clear to
anyone in doubt that the war is not over. It must be assumed that republican
elements not on ceasefire will eventually intensify anti-personnel attacks
on the security forces and loyalists. The response of the various
governments to the deaths of British soldiers and Police Service recruits
will almost certainly impact on plans for 'rolling' demilitarization. The
months ahead will bring new challenges that will determine the pace of
political life in Ireland for many years and reveal the wisdom or folly of
placing weapons beyond use in late October 2001.