Horse-trading for a coalition

Cathal McGovern

With talk of an impending election in the south and comment as to the likely outcome of such a contest for Sinn Fein in particular, assessing the advantage or otherwise of coalition as an election tactic has come to dominate the thinking of many republicans. Political commentators accept that Sinn Fein will achieve considerable success in the forthcoming election, but where matters progress from there remains open to debate.

Some have suggested that Sinn Fein would do well to consider entering into a coalition arrangement with Fianna Fail, while others have argued against such a pact. In essence, the question of coalition relates both to a need to acquire a voice on behalf of a party's mandate, and to somehow use the medium to advance toward a definite political objective.

The subject proves relatively simple for some republicans in respect to the latter point; For many there remains little evidence to suggest that republicans entering into a coalition arrangement in the south would achieve anything of substance.

The past, with the experience of Clann na Poblachtana, and Official Sinn Fein/The Workers Party, the latter entering Leinster House as opposed to a coalition executive, served to demonstrate the dangers. Therefore, we have to ask of ourselves several questions, and these questions we must approach in an open and honest manner as opposed to so doing from a curtain mentality bestowed as a consequence of adhering to the confines of an orthodox position.

Granted, Leinster House to many republicans never was, nor ever could, prove an instrument through which participation alone could advance the objective of a socialist Ireland. Equally, we must ask ourselves, what do we expect to achieve from entering the assembly at all?

Primarily though we must understand the merit and de-merits of the process of coalition, not necessarily strictly from a republican perspective. This point has been well debated. On the contrary, what we must appreciate is the mechanic of what could be referred to as the process of 'coalition bargaining'.

Coalition governments are formed through a process of 'horse trading' where the majority component seeks to entice its junior partner/s through a trade-off of the latter's electoral manifesto. Say in the case of the junior partner in a coalition, the smaller party contests the election on a manifesto seeking to secure a number of specific aims.

Following the verdict at the polls, this smaller party acquires say six elected TD's and find themselves approached by Fianna Fail to make up the numbers to form a government. From this point onwards the process of 'horse trading' commences with Fianna Fail more likely than not pledging itself to further only a number of the smaller party's manifesto promises. Usually the most radical of these promises are refused consideration by the larger partner, and this compromise offer confronts the smaller party with a dilemma?

Does the smaller party then accept the compromise thus betraying its electoral mandate in return for a minority voice at executive level? On the other hand, does it reject the compromise offer, and risk being portrayed by the media and establishment as the cause of instability in the country, while also perhaps losing support in a further contest?

What then can be gained either way? One view is that the smaller party should refuse to enter into coalition, on the basis that more can be achieved through remaining in permanent opposition than engaged in a process of permanent compromise dictated by the needs of a larger establishment party.

Consider the fate of the Irish Labour Party. Following the 1992 election Labour secured some 30 seats on the assurance of radical change. The party then entered into a coalition government with Fianna Fail, but failed to deliver on the radical promise. By 1994 Labour found itself decimated at the polls. Would Labour then have been better to have remained in opposition following the 1992 verdict, for some ten years later the party has yet to re-acquire the confidence of the electorate.

Given the above example, as a socialist I cannot afford any benefit to the tactic of entering into a coalition as a junior partner. There are many reasons, not least the view that such self-styled liberal assemblies are structured to restrict radicalism. However, that proves another debate, but in general terms, arriving at a decision to remain in permanent opposition in turn depends on the objective of a smaller party. The matter is best summarised thus;

In a case where the short-term objective is one that craves a voice or the respect of the establishment, and by that definition prove more enticing than the requirement of the longer-term objective, coalition as opposed to opposition holds merit. The trade-off is that any party which pursues such a course runs the risk of being tamed to the point of radical impotence by the establishment. Our history is littered with examples to that effect.

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