Peter Mandelson’s suspension of the Assembly until Sinn Fein was able to persuade the Provisional IRA to open its arms dumps for external inspection, gave a clear indication of how little autonomy is held by the new Stormont parliament. Any lingering doubts about the new ministers’ restricted influence were dispelled last July when Bairbre de Brun was humiliatingly forced to issue an order to close acute facilities in the South Tyrone hospital.

Limited as the powers of the Assembly are, there is a further constriction on the institution’s remit. The devolution of even limited power is moreover, conditional on a sufficiency of consensus among the members of the ‘Big House’. Evidence to date suggests that consensus is in short supply. An interminable and predictable wrangle over flags and emblems will eventually be resolved by an edict from the Secretary of State. A similar form of conflict resolution will see London decide how to deliver the recommendations of the Patten Report. The list of important decisions made in Downing Street will increase.

Whether there will ever be sufficient agreement to make the Assembly (or indeed the Six-County state) work is open to serious question. Two current examples of contention within the unionist family indicate that a substantial section of that community shall not be easily reconciled to consensus under any circumstances.

In one instance there is the election for the traditional unionist seat of South Antrim. The contest was effectively one between William McCrea of the DUP and David Burnside of the UUP. To see any measurable difference between the politics of the pair was in itself a minor conundrum. They are both right-wing, reactionary unionists who have been uncomfortably close to armed loyalism in the past. In a constituency where even a three way split in the unionist vote would not have returned a republican, the unionist electorate opted to make a choice between an ultra right-wing hick and a right-wing slick - and elected the former. This is not evidence of a desire for consensus government.

The other intra-unionist conflict is bloodier but no less indica-tive of certain unionist feelings. The loyalist feud is more than a struggle for control of drugs and territory. It is a battle for hegemony within that particular unionist constituency which believed in and conducted the unofficial war to preserve the Union.

In brief, the PUP/UVF leadership believes that with the Good Friday Agreement securing the Union and a Provo cease-fire, it is wise to afford some place to republicans and nationalists within the Six-county state. On the other hand, influential elements within the UDA/LVF feel that a secured Union and Provo surrender should be the signal for a restoration of the status quo ante bellum.

A significant aspect of the feud is why the PUP leadership feels it is necessary to side with the UVF. Given its support for the state, could the party not have demanded that the state deal with their UDA opponents? This is precisely what the UUP or DUP would have done if attacked by Adair et al. Consequently, there remains the very frightening spectre that more enlightened loyalists are reconciled to the reality that too many working-class unionists are still attracted to the mind-set that produced Lenny Murphy and the Dublin/Monaghan bombers. If this constituency was numerically irrelevant the PUP could ignore it.

These tendencies within unionism will prevent any meaningful and long-term accommodation in the North of Ireland. The question is whether this will lead to the collapse of the northern state or whether all meaningful decisions will be made in London while Stormont remains a purely ceremonial structure. In the short term it appears that the more likely outcome is the latter.

Something best described perhaps as devolution of pomp rather than of power.