by Tommy McKearney

Whenever a political party insists on retaining something as an option, it usually means that given the opportunity they will take that option. In reality, things could not be otherwise. What party could consider doing something that is fundamentally at odds with its basic strategy?

Politicians may play "hard to get" in order to drive a bargain or some win tactical advantage. Such manoeuvres are only possible though when the leadership of a party is able to contemplate making a deal. If political differences were irreconcilable there would be no value in confusing the party's faithful supporters and activists by sending out disturbing signals.

The recent decision by Sinn Fein at its Ard Fheis to refer the question of entering coalition means that if they are asked to so - they will. By reserving the right to convene a special conference, Sinn Fein is keeping its options open. It is disingenuous of the party's president to say that he may not wish to enter coalition with another party. He did after all put his personal authority behind the motion to reserve the option of governing in tandem with whomsoever.

There is nothing new of course about what Sinn Fein is proposing. In fact it is almost a constant of political life in Southern Ireland that a smaller, one time radical party joins a government coalition. It is also just as constant a fact of political life that the smaller coalition party eventually loses its "vinegar" while in office. Indeed, this course has been so often followed that the only surprise is that there are still those who protest that "it won't happen to us". Perhaps not and perhaps the old cat will stop supping cream.

The difficulty with entering coalition is that it involves a trade-off. In order for two or more parties to form an alliance, it is necessary that there is an agreed programme and an agreement on a share out of ministerial responsibility. Many innocents believe that at the pre-government forming or bargaining stage, it is possible to improve conditions on the administration to be. Such people envisage a scenario where five or six deputies holding the balance of power are able to write the agenda for the new cabinet. The reality is quite different.

A substantially larger coalition partner would commit political suicide by accepting the junior partner's entire programme. Why would anyone bother to vote for a party that merely acted as lobby fodder for its smaller ally? It may be argued of course that the junior partner might have only one core demand and that this would be easier for the larger party to accept. This might be possible under some circumstances but it really depends on what that core demand would be. No large party is ever likely to concede a major point of policy.

When this happens and therefore deprived of any chance or hope to affect the key elements of its programme, junior coalition partners then work to increase the party's influence and profile. This can only be achieved by working diligently within their allocated department of state. Before long the only practical remaining goal is to expand the party and put former objectives on the long finger. As the Austrian social democrats used to say, "maintaining the Movement becomes the objective".

A genuinely revolutionary republican political party would set out its non-negotiable agenda and work to have it implemented. The sine qua non of such a party would be its unwillingness to dilute its core programme on one hand and its commitment to enact that programme on the other hand.

In order to build a new and radical republicanism it is necessary to demand full, properly paid employment at all times as a constitutional right. There must also be a constitutionally guarded right to decent housing and the constitution must declare that the state will offer lifelong education as a right along side adequate and equal health-care. There must moreover be a clear declaration that all privilege due to class, creed or colour or wealth is inimical to the constitution of an Irish republic.

Radical republicanism must finally indicate how such a programme might be made a reality. It is not enough to have revolutionary programmes serve as eye-catching wallpaper in constituency offices while awaiting the coalition Mercedes to take one into middle-class conformity. It has to be said that this stricture applies to all and not just to those accepting parliamentary office.