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Fourthwrite......... For a socialist republic
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Waiting for Trimbo by John McAnulty Sinn Fein has been making most
of the political waves over the summer, but to little effect. The future
of political structures in the North and the shape of British rule is
not being decided by them but by shadowy developments in the Unionist
party. As in the Beckett play Waiting
for Godot political movement has been awaiting David Trimble, leader
of the Official Unionist party and former Premier of the colonial Stormont
parliament. In the play we waited for Godot to arrive. In Ireland we wait
for Trimble to go.Trimble is a victim of a series of events proclaimed
by the media as victories. In GoodFridayspeak it is victory: In order to understand what
has happened we have to understand the nature of the unionist debate.
It is not the case, as the British like to pretend, that Trimble has represented
a moderate wing anxious to support the Good Friday agreement.
Trimble drew on the experience of the Hillsborough agreement, where Britain
gave Dublin an advisory role in the North in return for de facto (now
de jure) recognition of the legitimacy of British rule. He argued that
the unionists had lost a great deal by being outside the negotiations
and would be best able to protect their sectarian privilege by working
inside the agreement. Those to the right of Trimble
(if there is anything more rightwing than a former leader of the semi-fascist
Vanguard movement) argued that sharing government with Catholics in general
and Sinn Fein in particular was too high a price to pay. In any case their
experience of the Hillsborough deal was that they had not paid a high
price for abstention. A Unionist campaign had forced the British to abandon
all the state and constitutional structures they had planned, leaving
only a small secretariat of Dublin civil service advisors who offered
a conduit for the Catholic bourgeoisie in the North to petition for some
share of political patronage. This hardly made a dent in the huge mass
of quangos, committees and advisory bodies that had grown up over 30 years
of British rule, the vast majority with inbuilt unionist majorities. The
Unionists had after all forced the collapse of the original Stormont regime
and overthrown the replacement set up under the Sunningdale agreement
rather than accept any diminution of their privileges. In fact British policy made
collapse inevitable. They had spent 30 years and endless billions defending
their role in Ireland and preserving the unionist base for that rule.
At the heart of the Good Friday agreement was a Trimble majority, demonstrating
that the agreement was safe for unionism. But to maintain that majority
Trimble had to demonstrate that he could secure the further humiliation
of republicanism and limitation of nationalism. This meant that there
were endless crises, each one resolved by the British tweaking the agreement
to the right. This was a totally painless
procedure for Unionism. After each twitch to the right they simply demanded
more. The price was paid by Sinn Fein, who had to explain to their supporters
why the British kept popping up and suspending what was supposed to be
an independent governing structure, and make greater and greater compromises
on what had begun as the total negation of their own programme for an
Irish democracy. It also left Trimble in the position of a man constantly
threatening his own suicide. Sooner or later the gun would go off. If
the British constantly conceded then there was no threat to unionist interests
and no need to accept structures such as Stormont if the price was Sinn
Fein in government. What makes the Donaldson programme,
if not Donaldson himself, key to unifying the unionists is that he has
never rejected the Good Friday agreement simply placing the condition
of total and abject surrender by the republicans as a first condition
and more lately the demand that Dublins advisory role be
downgraded as a second. Of course both of these conditions are useful
in uniting unionism but are at the moment impossible demands for a settlement.
The republicans have found that no amount of scurrying back and forward
with amended surrender statements will mollify the unionists. Any reduction
of Dublins role would risk the massive nationalist majority for
the agreement that remains after years of disappointment. The truth is that the Unionists
have realised that they remain central as the political justification
for Britains role in Ireland. As long as British strategy is based
around a moderate unionism there is no need to make concessions
and they are best able to protect their sectarian privileges through direct
rule structures which they dominate. In the past the loyalist groups
were condemned as the thugs they are. Now they benefit from state funding
and are automatically granted a totally undeserved stature as representatives
of Protestant workers.In the past the republicans were absolutely opposed
to the sectarian police force. Now they have agreed in principle to join
the police boards and are deeply involved in a whole series of local policing
initiatives that depend upon co-operation with the RUC/PSNI. The republicans can comfort
themselves with the absence of an opposition. Although there has been
a substantial growth in republican opposition military currents, they
have proved totally unable to mount a convincing political opposition. The smashing of the original Stormont was the greatest gain of the democratic struggle in Ireland. The fact that the British are unable to re-establish it, even in the absence of a mass anti-imperialist consciousness, bodes ill for them.
FOURTHWRITE, PO BOX 31, Belfast BT127EE |
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