Political Morality

Some observations by Mark Hayes

It might plausibly be argued that ‘morality’, broadly conceived, is the most promiscuous of concepts, especially when applied in the realm of politics. For instance, notions of morality have been invoked to justify a vast range of political perspectives, including the more reactionary creeds like Conservatism, and even Fascism! Indeed, the most recent acts of aggressive imperialism in Iraq have been ‘validated’, by certain political leaders, with reference to a certain moral code. In fact Tony Blair, speaking last year to the Welsh Assembly, remarked with appropriate solemnity that ‘Britain is a very moral nation with a strong sense of right and wrong’. Given the evident absurdity of such generalisations it is tempting to dismiss the whole idea of morality as an exercise in duplicity and deceit.

Of course Karl Marx had a particular and persuasive view of morality. In terms of its manifestation in concepts such as ‘rights’, ‘freedom’ and ‘justice’ in capitalist society, they were seen as a form of ideological mystification - an integral component in the mechanics of class deception. It is difficult not to concur with the essence of this. Significantly, Marxism not only claimed to expose the hypocrisy of bourgeois morality, it aimed to transcend the ethical critique of economic inequality expounded by so-called ‘utopian socialists’. Marxism was deemed to be ‘scientific’ in a meaningful sense, having identified the ‘laws’ underpinning the historical process.
Yet there is a paradoxical dimension to Marxist discourse, since at one level Marx’s work is replete with what might be termed ‘moral’ judgements, both implicit and explicit, with excoriating attacks on exploitation, alienation, servility and so on. It could also be argued that, in outlining the prospect of genuine human emancipation, Marx was proffering an inspiring moral vision. So maybe the morality ‘baby’ should not be thrown out with the bourgeois ‘bath water’ after all?

With such a reservation in mind it is certainly worth reflecting upon the recent work of moral philosopher Ted Honderich*, who bases his ‘principle of humanity’ on the ‘natural fact’ of morality, which is required he suggests, by our instrumental rationality. Empathy for others who are suffering, Honderich claims, is part of the essence of human nature, and we all desire ‘great goods’. These so-called ‘great goods’ include: physical well-being and the material means to a decent life; freedom and power; respect and self-respect; productive relationships (private and public); and the benefits of culture (including religion). In global terms, of course, many people are denied access to such goods, and ‘bad lives’ ensue. These ‘bad lives’, Honderich claims, are the direct result of deliberate acts, and (just as importantly) the omissions, of those living in affluence – this is a ‘terrible reality’. In this context Honderich has suggested that the tragic events of 9/11 should be seen as a ‘moral alarm clock’ to alert people to the nature of their wider responsibilities.

Moreover, Honderich’s reasoning has led him to defend, as morally justified, the violence of the Palestinians against Zionist oppression, and he has expressed sympathy for the tactics and objectives of the ANC and IRA. As Honderich has argued, ‘history is proof that peoples demand the freedom that is the running of their own lives in a place to which their history and culture attaches them. It is a freedom for which oppressed people have always fought’. In certain contexts the tactical utilisation of force to secure legitimate objectives is entirely appropriate – as he correctly observes, the facile idea that ‘violence never solved anything’ does not survive a moment’s serious consideration. Ultimately Honderich is a philosophical consequentialist, and arguments about methods are contingent upon possible outcomes and the balance of probabilities.

The purpose, in drawing attention to Honderich’s ideas, is not to endorse everything he has to say (since his approach raises many important questions), but to suggest that ‘morality’ may not be an entirely risible concept, or completely redundant as a way of analysing politics. Indeed, in some cases, a considered conception of political morality can raise critical questions about the nature of contemporary society, and the means required in order to transform society for the better. Indeed, if examined closely for reflective purposes, such ideas may prove extremely useful for Republicans. Certainly those Republicans who have been persistently seduced by a romantic and elitist militarism would benefit from a careful appraisal of Honderich’s principles, as might those whose strategic meandering has led them to assist in administering British rule from Stormont.

*Ted Honderich is author of After the Terror and Violence for Equality, which is being re-issued by Pluto Press as Terrorism for Humanity

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