Sinn Fein...material for coalition?

by Brian Hanley

A couple of years ago, during one of the periodic media frenzies over the growth of Sinn Fein’s political strength in the south I asked a party member what would happen if the party did, as contemporary reports were suggesting, at some stage enter a coalition government with Fianna Fail? ‘Probably nothing’ was his answer. Why? ‘Because most people don’t join Sinn Fein because it’s supposed to be socialist, they join because they want a united Ireland.’ Admittedly this response reflected the priorities of the individual concerned, but of course he had a point.

Throughout all the twists and turns of mainstream republican strategy over the last decade has there ever been a case of someone leaving the movement because they disagreed with Sinn Fein accepting funding from Irish American millionaires, or because the party has had to compromise on its social and economic polices through participation in government? All the talk of splits and potential crises has always revolved around issues like IRA decommissioning, disbandment or taking seats in Stormont. Issues perceived as key to the struggle for a united Ireland, rather than linked to social questions in other words.

Few political parties could carry off as well as Sinn Fein the denouncing of George Bush as an imperialist warmonger, while simultaneously praising his commitment to peace in Ireland. That Mark Durkan was visibly more uncomfortable with the whole idea of the Bush/Blair summit than anyone in Sinn Fein’s leadership was striking. A run of the mill social democratic party would no doubt suffer all sorts of embarrassing public rows and possibly resignations if it attempted the same manoeuvre. Yet, Sinn Fein, it seems emerges unscathed, and while many party members might have reservations, they keep them in house, because meeting Bush is part of moving the peace process forward, and the peace process, whatever the critics may think, is ultimately about bringing about a united Ireland. While republican critics of Sinn Fein may scoff, there is no doubt that the great majority of that party’s core membership believes that a united Ireland will be the end result of this process. After all, that is what their republicanism is all about.

This isn’t to suggest that republicans don’t care about social and economic issues. On the contrary, most would be to the left of almost anything else in Irish politics. But it is worth considering that these issues have almost never played the dominant role in key moments of the republican struggle. Despite Connolly and the Citizen Army the Easter Rising was not a socialist rebellion, and among its leadership while Pearse and Clark had sympathy with the aspirations of Labour, MacDermott for one, thought Larkinism an English importation.

For all the hopes placed in the First Dail’s Democratic Programme, it was considerably watered down by Sean T.O’Kelly and even then Michael Collins felt it too radical a document. More importantly, during the War of Independence itself the IRA at best stood aloof from social and economic questions, and at worst intervened to support big farmers and employers. The Civil War split was not over social and economic issues and despite the presence of socialists in the Anti Treaty IRA they never had a decisive influence.

Liam Mellows became a republican martyr because of his execution rather than his endorsement of radicalism. Tom Barry was fond of reminding the IRA’s left during the 1930s that Mellows had not been infallible and that most of the Anti Treatyites had rejected his advice in 1922. Indeed the only time the IRA has ever split over social questions was during that decade, with the departure of the Republican Congress in 1934. The late 1920s and early 30s mark the high water mark for radical influence within the IRA and even then substantial sections of the organisation remained highly sceptical of the value of social policies.

From the late 1930s till the 1960s, the dominant political culture of republicanism was a conservative one. And of course, despite the claims of the Officials, the 1969-70 split was not primarily about socialism or conservatism, but about failure of the IRA to defend northern nationalists. Since then the political culture of northern nationalism has been the key to republican politics, and for at least a hundred years, northern nationalism (and republicanism) has differed from its southern counterpart. The War of Independence was a very different affair in Belfast, than it was in Kerry and for all the times northern republicans complain about being sold out by the Treaty settlement, the fact remains that the Belfast IRA were largely pro-Collins.
Of course these are generalisations, and the differences between republicanism in Tyrone and Belfast or Derry and south Armagh may be as important as those may between the north and the south. What is important however, is that the experience of northern nationalists after partition, and the circumstances that brought the present day IRA into being, make the ‘national question’ paramount and mean that issues like coalition with Fianna Fail are never going to seriously fracture either Sinn Fein or the IRA.

This does however pose a question for those within Sinn Fein who see the steady progress of the party north and south as the key to undermining partition. In reality Sinn Fein is appealing to different constituencies on either side of the border and its progress in the south will be subject to limitations. In the north there is no doubt that the aggressive nationalism of the party can attract Catholic middle class support, particularly among the young, which once went to the SDLP. The fact that many leading party members have prison records is not too much of a hindrance, as long as the IRA doesn’t actually do anything now. What's more, young middle class Catholics are acutely aware of the injustices their grand parents suffered under Stormont and hence are happy to see Unionists frothing at the mouth over ‘terrorists in government.’

Sinn Fein seems to represent a force that won’t allow those injustices to happen again. In that context the SDLP’s decision to label itself ‘post-nationalist’ seems perverse. In the south however, different conditions apply. Sinn Fein has marketed itself as a ‘republican labour’ party (does it do this in Belfast?) and has largely made gains among working class communities impressed by the undoubted activism and commitment of the party. Unlike the old Workers’ Party, Sinn Fein, can for historical reasons also build a base in some rural constituencies.

That the Irish Labour Party seems to be transforming itself into Fine Gael means there is a sizeable niche for SF. However there are also limitations. For most people in the south the national question was solved in 1921. Aside from 1970-72 and to a much lesser (and more politicised) extent 1980-81, the southern constituency are alienated, rather than attracted to the issue of partition. According to the last Irish Times poll just 4% thought the suspension of the northern elections the most important political issue of the day.

Hence in the south, Sinn Fein has to stress social issues. Again, while of benefit in certain constituencies, to the southern voting public at large the IRA is not a political asset. While freeing the Castlerea Five makes perfect sense in west Belfast, it will get you few transfers in Limerick. And if SF is to make the breakthrough which some of its more excitable supporters talk about it will need to win middle class votes and transfers. But there is a deep hatred of Sinn Fein among the southern middle class, not least based on class snobbery. Sinn Fein in the south will largely remain a party of protest, particularly where there is no other activist opposition.

What this means for republicans in general is harder to judge. Constantly reminding Sinn Fein that it once stood for something different than it does now has its limitations, since the party has convinced its membership that from all this twisting and turning, there will eventually emerge a united Ireland.

FOURTHWRITE, PO BOX 31, Belfast BT127EE